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I. INTRODUCTION

People have long sought refuge from the cruelties of conquerors and
repressive governments. In this century, there has been more movement of
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persons seeking refuge than at any other time.'
The majority of persons seeking refuge are women and children. 2
However, despite their omnipresence refugees were not accorded formal
recognition on an international basis until the 1951 U. N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. 3 The great increase in the numbers of
persons seeking refuge compelled the formulation of a statement regarding
the treatment of claims for asylum.4 The purpose of the Convention was to
formulate a statement regarding the rights of those seeking refuge and the
rights of the nations to which they fled.5 The United States has been the
destination of choice for a significant number of refugees, largely because
of its tradition of welcoming immigrants and the downtrodden.6 The
United States government has often asserted its commitment to the
protection of refugees and those seeking asylum.7 However, some of the
decisions reviewed herein do not attest to this purported commitment,
especially in regard to claims for asylum founded upon gender-based
persecution.

1. See Deborah E. Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No Longer, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
771, 771 (1995); see also Anjana Bahl, Home Is Where the Brute Lives: Asylum Law and GenderBased Claims of Persecution,4 CARDOZO WOMENS L.J. 33, 34 (1997) (placing the number of
global refugees at over 20 million).
2. See Nancy Kelly, Gender-relatedPersecution:Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women,
26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 674, n.1(1994), citing Susan Forbes Martin, Issues in Refugee and
Displaced Women and Children, Division for the Advancement of Women/UNOV, at 1, U.N. Doc.
EGM/RDWC/1990/WP.1 (1990) (estimating that 75% of refugees and displaced persons are
women and young children.
3. See Teresa L. Peters, Note, InternationalRefugee Law the Treatment of Gender-based
Persecution:InternationalInitiativesas a Modeland Mandatefor NationalReform, 6 TRANSNATL
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (1996). International documents specifically designed to protect
refugee's rights include the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
openedforsignatureJuly 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention] and
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedforsignature Jan. 3 1,
1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1967 U.N. Protocol]. See Sarah Ignatius, Restricting the
Rights ofAsylum Seekers: The New Legislative and AdministrativeProposals,7 HARV. HUM. RTS.
REV. 225, 226 (1994).
4. See Peters, supra note 3, at 230.
5. See id at 229-30.
6. See Mary McGee Light, Note, The Well-FoundedFearStandardin Refugee Asylum: Will
It Still Provide Hope for the Oppressed?,45 DRAKE L. REV. 789, 791 (1997).
7. See Constance O'Keefe, Immigration Issues and Airlines, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 357, 360
(1994) (pointing out as evidence of this commitment the 1967 U.N. Protocol, to which the United
States is a signatory, and the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988)).
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II. BACKGROUND

In accordance with The Refugee Act of 1980,' the Attorney General has
the discretion to grant asylum 9 to any person who meets the statutory
definition of "refugee."' ° A claimant may obtain asylum upon
demonstrating persecution based on one of five enumerated grounds:
nationality, race, religion, political opinion, and being a member of a
particular social group." The asylum seeker must further demonstrate that
the persecution., 2 involving imprisonment and grievous or life-threatening
bodily injury, was "on account of" one of those five enumerated grounds. 34
Claimants must demonstrate that they would face persecutory treatment1
upon returning to their homeland, 5 and that the government of their
homeland has been unable or unwilling to control the allegedly persecutory
acts.' 6
These categories, first enumerated in the 1951 U.N. Human Rights
Convention, 7 do not address the types of human rights violation
committed against women that recently have been brought to the forefront
of international attention. 8 As one commentator observed: "The main

8. U.S.C. § 1101 (1988).
9. The following statistics depict the extent of the exercise of that discretion: "In the first
six months of 1997, 71,341 cases were completed by INS asylum officers, compared with 61,811
over the same period in 1996. Of these cases, 3,096 were approved and 30,334 were referred to the
immigration court." Arthur C. Helton, Criteria and Proceduresfor Refugee Protection in the
UnitedStates, 1021 PLI/Corp 243,258 (PLU Corp.Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. B47200, 1997) (statistics provided by the Asylum Division, Office of International Affairs,
Immigration and Naturalization Service (Aug. 1997)).
10. INA, § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). The Refugee Act removed restrictions that blocked
asylum seekers from countries other than those of the Communist bloc or the Middle East. See
Light, supranote 6, at 792; see also INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524.
11. See Nancy Kelly, Guidelinesfor Women's Asylum Claims, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES
813, 814 (1994) (referencing the INA, s. 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. S I101(a)(42))[hereinafter
Guidelines].
12. The lack of definition of "persecution" in The Refugee Act of 1980 was probably
intended to allow each case to be reviewed individually, rather than mechanically. See Bahl, supra
note 1, at 38.
13. Kelly, Guidelines, supra note 11, at 814.
14. It is not enough'to merely express a fear of future persecution. "[l]n order to demonstrate
a well-founded fear, a petitioner must present specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear
that he or she will be singled out for persecution." Zulbeari v. INS, 963 F.2d 999, 1000 (7th
Cir. 1992).
15. See INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489, 2501 (1984) (indicating that a non-citizen seeking
asylum must show a "clear probability" of persecution).
16. See Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1988); see generally,Helton,
supra note 9.
17. 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. I A(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 150; Peters, supranote 3, at 230.
18. See Peters, supra note 3, at 236. An argument can easily be made that the enumerated
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principles of refugee law enshrined in the 1951 Convention are based
exclusively on a narrow reading of human rights to cover only civil and
political rights as well as on an artificial and unsustainable demarcation
between the public and the private spheres of human existence."' 9 The
persecutory treatment referred to by women claiming asylum has typically
included state-sanctioned rape and forced pregnancy, forced sterilization
or abortion, and systematic governmental subjugation of women. 0 Claims
for asylum based upon subjection to persecutory treatment such as these
acts have become known as "gender-based" claims because the acts
committed were acts against women as women, not as members of a
particular race, religion, nationality, or political or social group.2 The
nature of the acts are such that men would not and could not be subjected
to them.22
The adjudication of gender-based claims for asylum has been
inconsistent as courts have struggled to "fit" the gender-based claim into
one of the five enumerated grounds for asylum. 23 The judicial gyrations
wrought by the adjudication of these claims have increasingly called the
efficacy of the enumerated grounds into question. 4 This note reviews
claims that have been brought on the basis of gender-based persecution and
grounds of persecution as set forth in the 1951 Convention discriminate against women and "there
is still a bias toward them when granting asylum." Gregory A. Kelson, Gender-BasedPersecution
and PoliticalAsylum: The InternationalDebatefor Equality Begins, 6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 181,
207 (1997); Peters, supra note 3, at 236.
19. J. Oloka-Onyango The Plight of the Larger Half-Human Rights, Gender Violence and
the Legal Status of Refugee and InternallyDisplaced Women in Africa, 24 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 349, 362 (1996).
20. See Anne M. Gomez, The New INS Guidelines on Gender Persecution:Their Effect on
Asylum in the UnitedStatesfor Women Fleeing the ForcedSterilizationand Abortion Policiesof
the People's Republic of China, 21 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.. Reg. 621, 638 (1996).
21. See Nancy Ciampa, United States Asylum Law: The Failure of the United States to
Accommodate Women's Gender-BasedAsylum Claims, 2 ILSA J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 494, 495
(1996).
22. One commentator has observed that "internatio,al human rights doctrines and
discourse-including those related to refugees-traditionally have excluded any specific discussion
of the rights of women and generally have failed to recognize sexual and related violence as serious
violations, even when committed or directed by a state or an agent of the state." Anker, supra note
1, at 775.
23. See Bahi, supra note 1, at 37.
24. See id
[T]here has been considerable confusion in this area of the law ... [and] the
gender-based persecution claims of women have been ignored or misunderstood.
The reasoning in the cases has not always been sound, and some of the decisions
clearly reflect a manipulation of the law in an effort to fit the claim into one of the
existing categories.
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argues that their adjudication was impeded by the lack of a specific
category for gender-based claims for asylum. It further argues that a sixth
ground for asylum is needed to address legitimate claims for asylum that
are currently being denied because they fail to 'fit' into any of the
enumerated grounds.
A. The Definition of Persecution
The question as to what constitutes persecution has been the subject of
much dispute,25 however, persecution has been generally construed as
threats to life and freedom, in addition to subjection to torture.26 The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Manual notes that "[s]erious
' 27
violations of basic human rights can constitute acts of persecution.
However, the Refugee Act of 1980, as codified within the Immigrant and
Nationality Act (INA), 28 includes no acknowledgment of violence that is
particular to women, such as rape, domestic abuse, and or other forms of
sexual violence often cited by women as their motivation to flee.2 9
Women have always comprised a significant percentage of refugees.30
Despite an increased awareness of the specific human rights violations that
female refugees face, international law has been slow to address their
plight.3 It is only within the past decade that issues specifically affecting
women have received international attention.32 Reports of atrocities
25. See Kelson, supra note 18, at 184, noting that courts determine whether certain actions
amount to persecution on an individual basis, since the circumstances vary with each case.
26. See Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969); Ciampa, supra note 21, at 499.
27. Diana Saso, The Development of Gender-based Asylum Law:A Critiqueof the 1995 INS
Guidelines, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 263, 279 n. 114 (Fall, 1997) (citing INS, OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL, ASYLUM BRANCH, BASIC LAW MANUAL: ASYLUM AND OVERVIEW CONCERNING
ASYLUM LAW 1, 20 (1991)) (alteration in the original). The Department of Justice drafted this
manual to be used by the INS in interpreting asylum law. See id.
28. INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524. The INA was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
29. See Daniel McLaughlin, Recognizing Gender-BasedPersecutionas GroundsforAsylum,
13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 217, 226 (1998).
30. In 1985, the Refugee Women and International Protection Report was published and it
was the first such UNHCR statement. See Saso, supra note 27, at 269 n.33. (citing U.N. HCR
Executive Comm., 36th Sess. I 11 5(4)(k), U.N. Doc. AIAG.96/673 (1985)). This report stated that
women and girls account for the majority of the refugees in the world "with many being exposed
to special problems due to their gender." Id.; see also Kelson, supranote 18, at 208. It is important
to note that "[w]omen and children comprise eighty percent of the world's potential refugee
population." Bahl, supra note 1,at 34.
31. See Priscilla Warren, Women Are Human: Gender-BasedPersecutionIsa Human Rights
ViolationAgainst Women, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 281,283 (1994)(citing Jill Lawrence, Gender
Persecution New Reason for Asylum; Human Rights: Women Face Bride Burning, Genital
Mutilation, Forced Abortions and Politically Motivated Rape, But Nations Have Been Slow to
Grant Refuge, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at A] 4).
32. See Saso, supra note 27, at 270. Between 1979 and 1993, the United Nations, through
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committed by Serb soldiers against Bosnian women, 33 state-sanctioned
brutality in Central America, 34 and forced abortion and sterilization in the
People's Republic of China 35 have aroused international concerns about
the special needs of women seeking refuge.36
B. The 1995 INS Guidelines
In an effort to address the increasing claims for asylum based upon
gender-specific persecution, the INS published Considerations for Asylum
Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women in May 1995.37 These
Guidelines direct immigration officers to consider that women may face
persecution unique to their gender. Rape, sexual abuse, infanticide, genital
mutilation, forced marriage, slavery, domestic violence, and forced
abortion or other harm inflicted upon a woman qualify as gender
persecution under the INS Guidelines. 38 The Guidelines, which do not have
the force of law behind them, advocate a higher sensitivity in interviewing
female 39claimants whose pasts may be fraught with difficult-to-discuss
details.
III.

EXISTING CATEGORIES

The social group category and to a lesser extent, the political opinion
criteria have often provided the framework for adjudicating gender-based
asylum claims. Asylum seekers have relied upon these enumerated grounds
largely because their amorphous definitions lend themselves to a wide
range of interpretations.4" Although the argument has been advanced that
these two grounds are broad enough to encompass gender-based

numerous initiatives brought attention to gender-based persecution to the attention of the
international community. See id.
33. See Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the
Failureof InternationalHuman Rights Law to Comprehendthe Injuries, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 793,
794 (1997).
34. See Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Laura Fletcher, et
al., Human Rights Violations Against Women, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 319, 319 (1993).

35. See Kelson, supra note 18, at 197-201.
36. See Bahl, supra note 1, at 33, n. 1. (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, at xiii-xxi (1995)("providing an overview

of the violations against women's human rights by governments, military regimes, police officers,
and private actors")).
37. See generally Kelly, supra note 2 (reprinting INS, PHYLLIS COREN OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, MEMORANDUM: CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASYLUM OFFICERS ADJUDICATING

ASYLUM CLAIMS FROM WOMEN (Dep't of Justice May 26, 1995) [hereinafter INS Guidelines]).
38. See id. at 814.
39. See id. at 799. The INS Guidelines acknowledge that women may be reluctant to reveal.
"the very delicate and personal issues arising from sexual abuse." Id. (citing INS GUIDELINES).
40. See Bahl, supra note 1, at 44.
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persecution, reliance upon these categories has produced uneven results.4
A. Social Group
To qualify as a member of a social group for asylum purposes, there
must be a shared characteristic that is so integral an aspect of the individual
that she should not be required to change the trait.42 The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook codified a generous
definition of social group 43 as a "particular social group normally
comprises persons of similar background, habit, or social status.",44 This
would be a readily identifiable group that shared a common culture,
political viewpoint, and lifestyle.45 Persons of similar economic status
would not be considered a social group under the definition.46 One recent
decision recognized persons with AIDS as comprising a social group for
the purposes of asylum. 47 Because of its breadth, the social group category
often overlaps with other asserted grounds for asylum.48
B. PoliticalOpinion
An asylum seeker whose claim is based upon political opinion grounds
"must (1) specify the political opinion on which he or she relies, (2) show
that he or she holds that opinion, and (3) show that he or she would be
persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution based on that
opinion."49 Some courts have recognized imputed political opinion as a
basis for granting asylum." The INS Guidelines instruct that in addition to
41. See id.
42. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Acosta, 19 1. & N.
Dec. 211,233 (BIA 1985)); see generallyKaren Musalo, The DevelopingJurisprudenceof GenderBased Claims, 1021 PLI/CORP 291 (1997).
43. See David Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as
Groundsfor Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 203,228 (1988) (citing OFFICEOF THE UNITED
NATIONS HAIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, para. 77, at 19 (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR
Handbook]).
44. Id. at 229 (quoting UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 19).
45. Members of groups may be barred if the group served a persecutory function, such as
Nazis, death squads, guerrillas who have participated in forced recruitment, and those who have
taken part in the persecution of others, perhaps even though unwittingly. Helton, supra note 9, at
254.
46. See Li v. INS., 92 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1996).
47. See Helton, supra note 9, at 250 n.70 (citing Matter of*** A71 498 940 (Oct, 31, 1995)).
48. The Swedish delegation to the 1951 Convention proposed the social group category as
a catch-all in case the other categories did not encompass "all the reasons for persecution an
imaginative despot could conjure up." Arthur C. Helton, Persecutionon Account of Membership
in a Social Group as a Basisfor Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 39,45 (1983).
49. Fatin, 12 F. 3d at 1239-40.
50. The district court in In Re Paniagua-Videsimputed the political opinions of a man who
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the question of whether or not views on issues that relate to gender can
constitute a "political opinion" under the INA, asylum officers also must
evaluate claims in which women assert that they have been persecuted on
account of the political opinion that was imputed to them by their
persecutor.51
C. Rape as Form of Gender-BasedPersecution
Rape has traditionally been thought of as a private act and its violent
nature has been trivialized. 2 It was not included in the definition of
"persecution" that would warrant a grant of asylum.53 The cases of two
rape victims from El Salvador seeking asylum in the United States
presented below illustrate the present inconsistency in the adjudication of
asylum law with regard to gender-based claims brought by women.
1. Campos v. INS
In the strife-ridden 1980's many women in Central America were
victims of state-sanctioned rape. 4 The acts were most often perpetrated by
soldiers upon women thought to be subversives or advocates of agrarian
reform. 5 Many of these victims sought asylum in the United States.56
Although the political opinion category provided the basis for some of the
women's asylum claims, it often did not prove helpful in furthering
claims." In Campos v. INS,' asylum seeker Campos was visiting the home

sponsored Christian study groups to his wife. Ref: 15 Sep 1983, BIA No. A-24166230, available
at United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, REFWORLD (visited Feb. 23, 1999).
<http://www.unhcr/refworld/legal/refcas/hcr0686.htm>. After the man's disappearance, the wife,
believing her life to be in jeopardy, sought asylum in the United States. See id. Despite the fact that
the asylum seeker was never subjected to any form of physical mistreatment or imprisonment,
asylum was granted. See id. An expert witness testified that "'it's close to an absolute certainty"'
a person who engaged in such activities (i.e. running a Christian study group and providing a shelter
for the poor) would "almost certainly" be subjected to persecution upon return to El Salvador. Id.
51. Anker, supranote I, at 807 (quoting INS GUIDELINES); see Kelly, Guidelines, supranote
11, at 815.
52. See Bahi, supra note 1, at 39.
53. See Jacqueline R. Castel, Rape, Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Persecution,4 INT'L
J. REFUGEE L. 39, 40 (1992).
54. See Scott Splittgerber, The Needfor GreaterRegional Protectionfor the Human Rights
of Women: The Cases of Rape in Bosnia and Guatemala, 5 WIs. INT'L L.J. 185, 222 (1996).
55. See generallyIn re Paniagua-Vides Ref: 15 Sep 1983, BIANo. A-24166230 (finding that
someone engaged in activities frowned upon by the government would certainly face persecution).
56. "Three hundred-fifty to four hundred thousand undocumented Central Americans are
believed to be living in California and many of them seek asylum. They comprised almost twothirds of the claims in the Ninth Circuit during the 1980s." Light, supranote 6, at 795 n.75 (1997).
57. Asylum to seekers from countries "hostile" to the United States, such as China and the
Soviet Union was granted at a rate exceeding 50% between 1983 and 1991. Sarah Ignatius,
Restricting the Rights of Asylum Seekers: The New Legislative andAdministrative Proposals,7
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of relatives active in the local agrarian cooperative when two armed men
entered the home, bound and gagged all of them, killed the men with
machetes and raped the women while an accompanying assailant shouted
political slogans.59 Campos spent fifteen days in a hospital as a result of a
nervous breakdown, found her way into the United States, and sought
asylum on the grounds of political opinion and social group.6 °
Campos contended that she was eligible for political asylum since her
presence in her uncle's home caused his political views to be attributed to
her. 6' She claimed that it was "unreasonable for the Board [of Immigration
Appeals] to assume that the persecutors' reasons for victimizing her were
different from their political motivations behind the torture, execution and
rape of her family members. 62 Moreover, since she witnessed the political
assassination of her relatives, she would be a likely target for future
reprisals.63
However, the Board of Immigrant Appeals (BIA) determined that the
brutality to which Campos was subjected was not politically motivated nor
was the BIA willing to impute the political opinions held by her relatives
that precipitated the attack upon them. 64 The BIA reasoned that there was
no way for the assailants to have known she would be at her uncle's home
on that day. Therefore, she had not been targeted for attack because of her
own political beliefs. 65 The BIA concluded that asylum may not be granted
solely because the attackers might have had political motivations.66
In the appeal, Campos claimed that the BIA construed statutory
language too narrowly, as exemplified by their assertion that "showing that
a persecutor's conduct furthers his goal in a political controversy is
insufficient to establish persecution on account of 'political opinion' within
the meaning of the Act.",67 Campos also claimed membership in the social
group composed of those who seek agrarian reforms as a basis for asylum,
but because this social group was founded upon a political philosophy68 of
agrarian reform, the court considered only the political opinion basis.

HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 225, 228-29 (1994). However the acceptance rate was less than 3% for those
from countries supported by the United States, including Haiti, El Salvador, and Guatemala. See
id.; see also Light, supra note 6, at 808.
58. Campos, 809 F.2d at 285.
59. See id at 287.
60. See id at 287-288.
61. See id at 287.
62. Id. at 288.
63. See id. at 289.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 288.
67. Id.
68. See id-
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The district court found, as had the BIA, that although Campos' uncle's
activities made him a target, it was unlikely the attackers expected her to
be there that day or that her presence there in any way precipitated the
attack.6 9 The court deemed the threats made against her to prevent her from
identifying her attackers to be "personal" and not due to any political
activity on her part.7" The district court was not willing to disturb the denial
of asylum "absent a showing that such action was arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion."7 Since the district court did not consider Campos'
claim as qualifying for asylum on any of the five enumerated grounds, it
found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denial of asylum.7 2
Campos clearly lacked recourse to her own government since her
attackers were members of the state militia and the government was not
willing to punish attacks made against agrarian reform advocates.7 3 Her
claim failed to fit into any of the enumerated grounds for asylum.7 4 The
availability of a gender-based persecution category would have eliminated
any need for a court to fit Campos' claim into pre-existing grounds.
2. Lazo-Majano v. INS
A different result was reached when the Ninth Circuit adopted an
expansive construction of the political opinion category in order to grant
asylum.75 In Lazo-Majano v. INS, the BIA denied a plea for asylum filed
by a woman who had been repeatedly raped, threatened with torture and
death, and beaten in public to the point of almost losing an eye.76 The
perpetrator of these acts was a member of the Armed Guard for whom she
had previously been employed as a domestic.77 He became very
domineering and allowed her no personal freedom.7" The BIA found that
the incidents described were personal acts of violence and therefore were

69. See id
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 289.
73. See id. at 290.
74. See id. at 288 (noting the BIA's conclusion that there was "no indication [Campos'
attacker] maintained an interest in her because of her political opinion or any other grounds
specified in the Act."). This clearly contradicted Campos' ardent claim that the attack was directed
against her relatives and herself precisely because they were associated with the agrarian reform
movement. See id. at 287. The agrarian reform movement in Central America had both political and
social objectives; the two realms do not exist in isolation. Because of her undisputed familial ties
with the agrarian reform movement, Campos' claim could haVe succeeded on either the political
opinion or social group grounds.
75. See Splittgerber, supra note 56, at 198.
76. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), overruledby Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).
77. See id. at 1433.
78. See id
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not within the scope of the INA.79 However, on appeal the Ninth Circuit
found that asylum was warranted upon the "political opinion" basis.8" Lazo
would likely have been killed as a subversive if she had identified her
tormentor. 8' Because it was unlikely that as member of the Armed Guard,
her tormentor would be sanctioned for his actions, she was without
recourse.8 2 The Ninth Circuit applied a broad construction of the "political
opinion" basis to grant asylum for what it deemed a meritorious claim. 3
If a category for gender-based persecution had been available, the Ninth
Circuit would not have had
to outdo "Lewis Carroll in application of the
' 4
term 'political opinion.5' i
3. Fleeing Brutality and Rape in El Salvador: Conclusion
Lazo and Campos illustrate the inconsistency in adjudicating asylum
claims when state-sanctioned rape is the act of persecution. Rape has often
been characterized as a personal assault, belonging to the private, not the
political, realm and courts have reflected the general societal unwillingness
to recognize that rape can be a weapon directed against those who would
thwart the will of the prevailing governmental or military powers. Neither
woman was a member of the politically empowered class (nor of the
economically and socially elite). Both women were either connected with,
or suspected of being connected with, an opposition group. Clearly, both
women were without recourse from their own governments since their
attackers were members of the military units and, as such, would probably
never be held accountable for their crimes. The Preamble to the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, states:
[V]iolence against women is a manifestation of historically
unequal power relations between men and women ....The
system of male dominance has historical roots and its
functions and manifestations change over time. The

79. See id at 1434. In Lazo-Majano, the BIA referred to In re Pierre, 151 & N Dec. 461 (BIA
1976) which held that a wife whose husband, a high Haitian official, made death threats against her,
"did not show persecution for a political opinion even though the government of Haiti would not
restrain her husband." Id.
80. The Lazo court found that Lazo did "have a political opinion, camouflage it though she
does. She believes that the Armed Force is responsible for lawlessness, rape, torture, and murder.
Such views constitute a political opinion. And she has been persecuted for possessing it." Id. at
1435.
81. It was clear to the Ninth Circuit Court that Lazo feared persecution "on account of the
opinion Zuniga attributes to her." Id.at 1436.
82. See id at 1433.
83. See id at 1436.
84. Id.at 1437 (Poole, J. dissenting). According to the dissent, the petitioner was victim of
humiliation, abuse and domination on a personal, not state, level. See id.
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oppression of women is therefore a question of politics,
requiring an analysis of the institutions of the State and
society, the conditioning and socialization of individuals, and
the nature of economic and social exploitation. The use of
force against women is only one aspect of this phenomenon
which relies on intimidation and fear to subordinate women. 8
The inability of the courts to recognize rape as possibly being a political,
persecutory act indicates the pervasive male orientation of asylum law and
its interpretation and the need for an update in its terminology to reflect the
reality of the female experience.86
D. Fleeing Repressive Islamic Laws
The political opinion and social group categories have also proved to be
of little assistance to women seeking asylum from fundamentalist regimes
that uphold highly restrictive and discriminatory laws for women. 7 While
acknowledging the rich and varied Islamic tradition, the use of religion to
persecute women is of great concern to advocates of human rights.88
Islamic discriminatory practices provide examples. The INS Guidelines
indicate that "persecution for non-compliance with moral codes constitutes
a violation of fundamental beliefs, thereby satisfying the persecution
element of asylum." 89 Implementation of a category for gender-based
persecution would resolve much of the current inconsistency evident in the
adjudication of these claims. 90
1. Fisher v. INS
In Fisherv. INS,9' the petitioner sought asylum on the grounds that her
political beliefs were so at variance with those of the fundamentalist sect
in control in Iran that she would surely face persecution if forced to

85. Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1994/959 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, The Work
of CEDAW: Reports of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Vol. 1, 1982-1985, Vol.2 1986-1987, U.N. Doc. ST/CSDHA/5 (1989), U.N. Sales No.
E.89.1V.4.
86. See Elizabeth A. Kohn, Rape as a Weapon of War: Women's Human Rights Duringthe
Dissolutionof Yugoslavia, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 199, 201-02 (1994).
87. See generally Alison E. Graves, Women in Iran:Obstacles to Human Rights andPossible
Solutions, 5 AM. U. J.GENDER & L. 57 (1996-97).
88. See generally id.
89. Saso, supra note 27, at 281.
90. See McLaughlin, supra note 29, at 244; see also Priscilla Warren, Women Are Human:
Gender-BasedPersecutionIs a Human Rights Violation Against Women, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 281, 290 (1994).
91. 79 F. 3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).
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return. 92 Fisher claimed that before she left Iran she was detained and
interrogated at length because she had attended a party at which were
present men in bathing suits. 93 She was reprimanded and questioned for
four hours and then released. 94 On another occasion, she was stopped on
the street. by four government officials, ordered at gunpoint into their car
and then detained and interrogated because she had "by mistake" allowed
several strands of hair to escape from her chador, or veil. 95 The arrest of a
politically active relative and Fisher's subsequent questioning in regards
to these activities forced her to conclude she was in mortal danger in Iran.
96
She then came to the United States as a fianc6 of a United States citizen.
Those marriage plans were canceled but she married someone else, a
marriage which lasted a year and which the court assessed a "sham"
marriage.97 The BIA found that the incidents Fisher experienced did not
amount to persecution 98 and Fisher did not establish a clear probability
that she would face persecution were she to return to Iran.9 9 The district
court sustained BIA's denial of Fisher's asylum.'
The political opinion category for asylum failed Fisher because she
could not establish, to the court's satisfaction, that her actions in
furtherance of her political beliefs had caused her to be selected for
persecutory treatment.'0 1The BIA determined that neither the "bathing suit
party" interrogation nor the "hair escaping from chador"reprimand had
anything to do with her political beliefs.0 2 Her relative's imprisonment for
political activities did not alone create a likelihood that she would face
persecution, as other members of her family were able to live
92. See id. at 960.
93. See id. at 959.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id
97. The court also considered evidence of payment to Fisher as proof of a "sham" marriage,
but in fact, many cultures involve some sort of payment with marriage, as sort of a "start-up" fund.
Id. In the U.S. a parental gift of money, often given, does not constitute evidence of a "sham"
marriage. See id at 972 (Noonan and Fletcher, J.J., dissenting). The dissent, however, considered
the fact that Fisher used notes at the interview "amazingly non-probative of deceit," because the
notes contained information about her parents' places and dates of birth, information about which
she would have no reason to lie. Id. at 973.
98. Fisher had to establish eligibility on the basis of a "well-founded fear of persecution."
Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995). Fisher's fear of persecution had to have been both
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. See Fisher,79 F.3d at 960.
99. See Fisher,79 F.3d at 960.
100. See id. at 965.
101. See id. at 960.
102. See id. at 964-65. The BIA claimed that it was "bound by [its] earlier decisions, which
define 'persecution' generally as 'the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race,
religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive."' Id. at 961 (citing Ghaly, 58 F.3d at
1431).
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undisturbed." °3 The court found it significant that Fisher did not state that
she would defy the traditional dress laws of Iran upon her return., 4 Indeed,
the fact that she was wearing a chador when the errant hairs escaped
indicates that although she would prefer not to, she is willing to conform
to the laws of Iran."°5 Fisher failed to establish a record of active antigovernment protest and failed to prove that the treatment to which she was
subjected amounted to persecution. 0 6 Moreover, the court was likely
influenced by what the INS official deemed her "sham marriage."'0 7
The Fisher dissent took strong issue with the majority's failure to
recognize the INS guidelines' call for greater acknowledgment of
persecution directed at women for displaying opposition to the
government.' The dissent further took issue with the majority's failure to
accept "[t]he guidelines'... invitation to develop asylum law with special
attention to the problems of women oppressed on account of their
nonconformity with the moral codes of a rigorist regime."'0 9
2. Safaie v. INS
In Safaie v. INS, 0 as in Fisher, the BIA maintained a narrow
construction of what constituted a well-founded fear ofpersecution."' The
petitioner, a citizen of Iran who had been discharged from her job at the
time the Shah was exiled had been expelled from Tehran University for
failure to follow Islamic law." 2 She had been active in several antigovernment protests and was told by members of the Revolutionary Guard
that she would be "caught and punished" for her failure to follow
customary Islam traditions." 3 The petitioner came to the United States on
a visa, but extended her stay and applied for asylum." 4
At her deportation hearing, the district court found that the social group
103. See id. at 963.
104. See id. at 962.
105. See id. at 960, 963.
106. See id. at 962-63.
107. Id. at 965. During the interview, she answered questions about her husband's personal
habits by referring to notes, leading the interview to suspect that she needed the notes as a prop. See
id. But see id. at 973 (observing that the "notes were amazingly non-probative of deceit") (Noonan
and Fletcher, J.J. dissenting).
108. See id. at 967 (Noonan and Fletcher, J.J. dissenting).
109. Id.
110. 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994).
111. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439,445 (B.I.A. 1987) ("(A)n applicant for asylum
has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances would
fear persecution")(noted in Connie Ericson, In Re Kasinga: An Expansion of the Groundsfor
Asylum for Women, 20 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 671, 686, n. 1 I I (1998)).
112. See Safaie 25 F. 3d at 638-39.
113. Id. at 638.
114. See id.
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category was not available to Safaie because a "social group" must have
voluntary association and there must be a shared, identifying
characteristic."' The social group alluded to in Safaie was that of Iranian
women and was deemed overly broad.6 The court suggested that had
Safaie claimed membership in a group of Iranian women that was so
committed to rebellion against the current regime that they would not wear
the traditional garb, such a group would probably have fulfilled the social
group requirements.17 The problem was that Safaie had in fact worn the
traditional dress and failed to evince any kind of "missionary fever" in
opposition to the current regime.'
Similarly, Safaie failed to demonstrate that she feared "particularized
persecution directed at her personally on the basis of her political
opinion."" 9 Although Safaie was expelled from the university for political
reasons, she was later readmitted. 2 ' This, along with the fact that neither
she nor any of her family members were harmed as a result of her political
activities, did not suggest that she would be treated any differently from
any other Iranian. Therefore, asylum was denied.' 2 '
3. Fatin v. INS
The inability to fit a claim into one of the enumerated grounds similarly
plagued the asylum seeker in Fatinv. INS.'22 Fatin had come to the United
States on a student visa and, upon completion of her studies, petitioned for
asylum.' 23 She referred to her feminist activities in Iran and membership
in a group that was founded by the Shah's sister as support for her claim
on both "political opinion" and "social group" grounds.'24 Some of Fatin's
relatives had been jailed, interrogated, and harassed for opposition to the

115. See id. at 640. The court stated: "In addition, 'characteristic' includes that which is
,essentially beyond the petitioner's power to change' or is so fundamental to the individual's
identity or conscience that he or she ought not to be required to change." Id. (quoting AnanehFirempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir.1985)).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See id
121. See id.
122. 12 F.3d 1233 (1995).
123. See id. at 1235.
124. See id. at 1236-37. The Ninth Circuit held that "feminism denote[s] a political belief
rather than membership in a social class." Kate McGuire, Ninth Circuit Holds That Gender
DiscriminationDoes Not Constitute Persecution; BIA Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Petition to Remand, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 783, 784 (1996) (citing Moghaddam v. INS, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15134, at *6 (9th Cir. 1996)(mem.)).
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Iranian government.' 25 However, the court found that Fatin presented no
clear evidence that she had been subjected to persecution in the past or that
she would face persecution upon her return to Iran.126 Further, Fatin failed
to indicate whether she would continue to advance her feminist beliefs
once she returned to Iran and also what effect the government's
requirement of observing traditional Islamic customs would have upon
her. 2" Because she did not establish a history of outspoken political
activity against the government, the political opinion category was not
effective for Fatin. 128 As for the "social group" basis for asylum, the BIA
found this insufficient because Fatin failed to identify a common
characteristic shared with others in a group, a trait so essential to her
identity that she should not have to change it in order to avoid
persecution. 29 Failing on both of these enumerated grounds, Fatin was
denied asylum.
Although the social group category failed to persuade the Fatin court,
the Safaie court left open the possibility that membership in a group
including women who were vehemently opposed to the second-class status
afforded women and state-sanctioned or state ordered discrimination of
women could satisfy statutory requirements. 30 Fatinillustrates the poorlydefined nature of both the political opinion and social group categories and
the difficulty courts have had in adjudicating gender-based claims
predicated upon these grounds. 3 ' The ambiguity inherent in both the
political opinion and the social group categories has enabled inconsistency
to prevail.
4. Fleeing Oppression: Conclusion
Commentators have noted the restrictions that Shari'a law places upon
Iranian women' 3 2 and that Iranian feminists risk severe punishment,
imprisonment, even death every time they assert rights. 133 Despite this,
courts have refused to recognize that opposition to repressive laws
constituted political opinion-based persecution worthy of asylum."' Safaie,
125. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1235-36.
126. See id. at 1237.
127. See id. at 1241.
128. See id. at 1242.
129. See id. at 1239, 1241-42.
130. "[Clonsiderable confusion has resulted as the courts have struggled to come to terms with
this area of the law." Bahl, supra note 1, at 44.
131. See Graves, supra note 88, at 77.
132. See generally id.
133. See Fisher, 79 F.3d at 961 (where the court noted the BIA's conclusion that "although
enforcement of Iran's dress and conduct rules may seem harsh by Western standards, it does not
'rise to the level of persecution').
134. See Kovac, 407 F.2d at 106-07 (Congress's deletion of "physical persecution" from the
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Fisher, and Fatin failed to establish a level of such abhorrence to the
current fundamentalist Islamic regime that would indicate that being forced
to live under it would constitute persecution. 13 Immigration courts,
however, have not indicated exactly how much abhorrence is needed to
obtain asylum. 136 The claimants failed to convince the courts that they
would be publicly outspoken against their governments and would
therefore be subjected to physical violence if they returned to their
homeland. The courts failed to consider the fact that as women facing
deportation, they would be reluctant to announce their intention to defy
governmental policies with which they disagree. Furthermore, the courts
did not clarify how much public outspokenness was required of asylum
claimants in order to prove the likelihood of future persecution, nor how
much physical mistreatment at the hands of the state was 137
required before
a claimant would be granted asylum in the United States.
According to the courts, the three claims here presented did not fit any
of the pre-existing grounds for asylum. A category for gender-based
persecution would relieve women and the courts of the necessity of3
attempting to fit claims into the current enumerated grounds for asylum. 1
A gender-based category for asylum would have provided a means for
granting asylum in instances where a government's
policy is overwhelming
39
discriminatory and oppressive toward women.'
Consider the 1985 incident in which a Soviet seaman jumped ship and
swam to shore in New Orleans, an incident which had "enormous

Act indicates persecution may include mental suffering); see also Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640-41 (general
assertion that Iran's policies are repressive or that applicant disagrees with them does not
"demonstrate that [the applicant] fears particularized persecution directed at her personally on the
basis of her political opinion").
135. See Fisher,79 F.3d at 968 (Noonan and Fletcher, J.J. dissenting) (referring to the INS
Asylum Officers Guidelines' emphasis that persecution should not be evaluated "solely on the basis
of the physical sanction" and that "requiring a person with religious views different from those
espoused by a religious regime to conform to the regime's laws when the laws are fundamentally
abhorrent to that person's religious convictions could result in anguish amounting to persecution.").
136. See Saso, supra note 27, at 280 (noting that the INS Guidelines explain that the "degree
of abhorrence would have to be shared by a reasonable person in the circumstances of the
applicant"). Id.;
see also Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241 where the court provided some guidance as to how
much opposition was required in order for a claimant to obtain asylum by stating that "ifa woman's
opposition to the Iranian laws in question is so profound that she would choose to suffer the severe
consequences of noncompliance, her beliefs may well be characterized as 'so fundamental to [her]
identity and conscience that [they] ought not be required to be changed."' Id.
137. See Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640; see also Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241.
138. See Graves, supra note 88, at 66 & n.55; see also Alexandra J. Zolan, The Effect of
Islamization on the Legal andSocial Status of Women in lran,7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 184, 184
(1987).
139. Kelly, Guidelines, supra note 11, at 816, n.22 (quoting INS, U.S. LAW AND INS
REFUGEE/ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS: THE BASIC LAW MANUAL 24 (1994)); see Anker, supra note

1, at 782 n.30.
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emotional appeal" for the Supreme Court. 4 ° For the Supreme Court, that
act "trigger[ed] an awareness of gratefulness for our own circumstances,
and require[d] an affirmation of regard for all who shall seek to flee to the
shores of Freedom." 141 Obviously, no such awareness was triggered by the
plight of an Iranian woman seeking to escape a society that subjugates
women to the degree that they are almost wholly devoid of any rights. This
woman stirred no such emotion in the judicial consciousness. Perhaps this
is why feminist critics have suggested that no category4 2exists that reflects
the kinds of oppression women generally experience.
E. Opposition to ForcedImpregnation,
ForcedAbortion and Sterilization
It hardly needs to be stated that the ability to control one's own
' The decision as to when
reproductive life is central to self-determination. 43
to reproduce and with whom is so individual, so critical to one's integrity
that it shocks the conscience to have this control reside in the hands of the
state. The forced impregnations of Bosnian women by Serb soldiers and,
at the opposite but equally shocking end of the reproductive terrorism
spectrum, the forced sterilization and abortions in the People's Republic
of China have raised international concern.
1. The Former Yugoslavia
One of the most illustrative examples of gender-specific persecution is
the mass rapes that have occurred in Bosnia.' Although rape has been a
fact of war throughout the ages, the most recent conflict between Serbs and
Bosnian Muslims has attracted international attention for several reasons.
First, the number of Bosnian women who have been raped by Serbs is
overwhelming.' 45 Second, the act of rape has been used systematically as
140. Medvid v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 621 F. Supp 503, 509 (1985).
141. Id.
142. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
59, 69 (1993) (asserting that male reality has become human rights principle).
143. State-enforced abortions fairly come under the definition of "persecution." According to
one commentator, "[tihese atrocities violate fundamental, non-derogable human rights." John
Linarelli, Violence Against Women and the Asylum Process,60 ALB. L. REV. 977, 981 (1997).
144. See generally Linda Malone, Beyond Bosnia and In Re Kasinga- A FeministPerspective
on Recent Developments in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 319
(1996).
145. See Danise Aydelott, Comment, Mass Rape During War: ProsecutingBosnian Rapists
Under InternationalLaw, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 585, 606 & n.136 (1993) (reporting that the

Centre for Genocide and War Victims places the number of Bosnian Muslim women who have been
raped, between April 1992 and January 1993, at around 30,000) (citing Davor Huic, CroatExperts
Say Serbs Raped 30,000 Women, REUTERS, Jan. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuters World Service File). For a thorough discussion of mass rape in the Bosnian war, see Kohn,
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a tool to force the exodus of Bosnian Muslims, thereby achieving "ethnic
cleansing."' 14 6 In addition, 147
the rapes have the intent of furthering one race
while destroying another.
The pattern has been that Serb forces overtake a village, separate the
villagers by gender, and take the women and children to a detention
facility. 14 It is in these facilities that the women are raped, often in public
149
in front of as many as two hundred witnesses, including children.
Accounts have indicated that the women were told by their Serb captors
that "you will now bear a Serb baby."' 5 ° Claims of forced impregnation
have been substantiated by interviews with victims conducted by the
International Red Cross and the UNHCR. '' Not only do these reports
substantiate the claims of forced impregnation, but also investigators from
the World Council of Churches in Geneva interviewed refugee victims and
Serb defectors who corroborated that Serbs were raping women to
impregnate them.'52 Another corroborating factor was the great increase in
the number of abortions during this period.5 3
Since the elimination of one race in favor of another is central to the
mass rape campaign of terror carried on by the Serbs, a woman *claiming
"race" as a basis for asylum could prevail on that ground. 15 4 However, a
court would be likely to narrowly construe the term "race" and find that
since the region is heterogenous, the concept of race is ambiguous enough
to deny asylum on that basis.' The presence of a category for gender
persecution would insure against this type of restrictive applications.

supra note 87, at 201-02 (suggesting that one of the most significant problems with current
international law has been its inability or unwillingness to stop rape and forcible impregnation of
women); William Walker, Making RapistsPay: Lessonsfrom the BosnianCivil War, 12 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL CoMMENT 449-68 (1997).
146. See Aydelott, supra note 147, at 602,605. The term "ethnic cleansing," which was in use
by mid-1992, is reputed to have been introduced by Croat and Bosnian Serb in reference to the
means used to accomplish "ethnically 'pure' areas." Ulrike Davy, Refugees From Bosnia and
Herzogovina, Are They Genuine?, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 53,116-17 (1995); Fletcher,
et al., supra note 32, at 320.
147. See generally Mackinnon, supra note 144.
148. See Fletcher, et al., supra note 32, at 320.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See Roberta 0. Bresnick, Reproductive Ability as a Sixth Ground of Persecution Under
the Domestic and InternationalDefinitionsof Refugee, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 121, 125
(1995).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 134.
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2. China's One-Child Policy
In an effort to halt explosive population growth, China implemented a
rigid one-child policy 5 6 that has been seen as causing an egregious
trammeling of human rights.'" Forced sterilization, though performed on
both men and women," 8 has often been cited as a form of genderpersecution because women comprise the majority of forcibly sterilized
persons. In addition, the issue of forced abortions is assuredly a form of
gender-based persecution."
The Department of Justice in 1988 issued policy guidelines to the INS
"designed to ensure that asylum could be granted to persons who could
show well-founded fear of government persecution stemming from the
PRC's involuntary sterilization and abortion programs.' 60 However, these
guidelines were virtually ignored by the BIA. The BIA stated in Matter of
Chang 6 ' that it was not bound by the guidelines and ruled that
a generally
62
applicable policy based on economics was not persecutory.1
156. See Gomez, supra note 20, at 623-24 (implementation of this "one family-one child"
policy began in 1979 by local government officials and is carried out inconsistently).
157. See Bresnick, supra note 153, at 128, (noting that the PRC government admits that
punishment is rare and no documented cases of punishment exist).
158. See id.
at n. 46 (citing Steven W. Mosher, 'One Family, One Child. 'China'sBrutalBirth
Ban-For Chinese Women, It's Abortion or Sterilization,WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1987, at DI). It is
to be noted that the Federal Court of Canada found that the fear of forced sterilization and forced
abortion for women who already have one child constitutes gender-based persecution and that
"women in China who have more than one child and who are faced with forced sterilization" are
identified by a purpose which is "so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be
required to alter it." Cheung v. M.E.I., 102 D.L.R.4th 214 (1993).
159. See Guo v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 861(E.D. Va. 1994) (concerning asylum granted
to a Chinese man fleeing the oppressive one-child policy).
160. See id. at 153; see also Allison D. Sealove, Shu-hao Zhao v. Schiltgen: Persecution on
Account ofPoliticalOpinion-InconsistenciesandAmbiguities, 23 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 309 (1997).
161. In Chang, the BIA held that although China's family planning policy could be
implemented in a way that would serve as a basis for asylum under the INA
[tlo the extent.., that such a policy is solely tied to controlling population, rather
than as aguise for acting against people protected by the Act, we cannot find that
persons who do not wish to have the policy applied to them are victims of persec
ution or have a well-founded fear of persecution within the present scope of the
Act.
Id. at 44.
162. Guo, 842 F.Supp. at 862. The Congressional Record described the guidelines as follows:
DOJ guidelines, noting that the PRC government views such defiance [i.e.,
opposition to involuntary sterilization] as an act of "political dissent," state that
"a finding of the requisite well-founded fear of persecution under these
circumstances is reasonable." This constitutes persecution for "political opinion"
under the Immigration Act and would result in a grant of asylum.
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In Chang,one of the early asylum cases based on opposition to the onechild policy, the asylum seeker's wife refused to undergo an abortion and
sterilization. 63 The asylum-seeker's wife fled to another province and
when the officials came to take him away to be sterilized, he fled to the
United States.' 64 The immigration court found that grounds for asylum
existed, but the INS appealed. 6 The BIA held that the one-child policy
was a means of population control, guided by economics, not malevolence,
and therefore was not an act ofpersecution.' 6 The BIA argued that persons
seeking asylum on the basis of this policy did not have "a well-founded
fear of persecution within the present scope of the Act''167 and that none of
the enumerated grounds provided a basis for asylum. 16' The BIA further
stated that any change in immigration laws to allow for asylum for was the
domain of the legislature.

69

It specifically found that the social group

category was not applicable because the group of Chinese nationals fleeing
the one-child policy was too large to constitute a "voluntarily association,"
the policy did not constitute persecution and the policy was not selectively
applied. 70 The political opinion category was not applicable because the
one-child policy was neutral in principle."' The BIA found that "the fact
that a citizen of another country may not enjoy the same constitutional
protections as a citizen of the United States does not mean that he is
therefore persecuted on account of one of the five grounds enumerated in
section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act.""72 Furthermore, Chang failed to
establish "persecution" since neither he nor his wife had been selected for
implementation of the policy and the government's harsh treatment of
them was not motivated by ill will or malevolence, just demographics and
economics." 3
3. The Fallout From Chang
Immediately after the Changdecision, Congress passed the ArmstrongDeConcini Amendment to the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act

Id. at 862-63 (quoting 135 CONG. REC. S8244 (daily ed. July 19, 1989)).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See Chang, Int. Dec. 3107, at-39.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 43.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp. 814, 815 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
See Chang, Int. Dec. 3107, at 44.
See id. at 47.
See id.
See id at 43 (stating that the birth control policy was a legitimate population policy

uniformly applied to all PRC citizens and was not "on its face persecutive").
173. See id. at 44.
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of 1989.174 This provided for opposition to the one-child policy as a basis
for asylum. 175 President Bush vetoed the legislation because he
disapproved of other portions of the bill. 76 Subsequent votes failed to
override his veto. 77 Ever determined to provide a means of asylum for
those who meet with harsh measures because of their opposition to the
one-child policy, provisions were incorporated into the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) 71 IIRIRA
clearly establishes fear of coerced abortion or sterilization79 as a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 1
Opposition to the Chang decision was immediate and vocal, emanating
from all sides of the political spectrum.' Many perceived as so much
empty rhetoric the BIA's contention that because the PRC's one-child
policy is economically motivated and is generally applied, it is not
persecutive.'
Commentators have raised issue with the economic
justification of this policy. One can easily survey twentieth century history
to locate several instances of flagrant human rights abuse for which an
"economically necessary" justification was provided. One could speculate
that the Changruling reflected concerns that ships and planes would soon
be disgorging legions of PRC exiles fleeing the one-child policy and
requesting asylum in the United States. However, this vision is grounded
more upon unreasoned fear than a likely future reality.
IV.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST A CATEGORY

FOR GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION

One of the most widely advanced argument against implementing a
gender-based persecution category is that this would result in a veritable
onslaught of unfounded and unverifiable claims for asylum.8 2 This type of
"floodgates argument" is a fear-inspired reaction that has greeted almost

174. See Bresnick, supra note 153, at 138 n. 100 (citing Armstrong-DeConcini Amendment
to the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, H.R. 101-2712 (1990)).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (amending scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
179. See Xiu-Qin Shen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp. 814, 815 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Matter of
G-, Int. Dec. 3215 (BIA Dec. 8, 1993)).
180. See Sealove, supra note 161, at 316.
181. See Bahl, supra note 1, at 70.
182. The floodgates argument has been taken by some commentators to indicate a growing
hostility toward immigrants and would-be immigrants, hostility evidenced by the passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, a massive welfare
reform bill that significantly reduced benefits for legal immigrants. See Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; see also The
Harvard Law Review Association, Recent Legislation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1191, 1191-92 (1997).
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every legal innovation. 183 There is little basis in reality for its advancement.
One need only look to the example set by Canada to refute the "floodgate"
argument.'84 Canada has adopted a policy of granting asylum on the basis
of gender-based persecution, yet it has not experienced a flood of asylum
claims.'85 The fear of fraudulent claims for asylum inundating INS is
clearly unfounded.186 As in other courts, an immigration attorney who
presents a frivolous claim to a court will be subject to sanctions.' 87
Reluctance to encourage frivolous claims should not lead courts to deny
those with a meritorious claim for asylum.
The "slippery slope" argument also has been advanced to counter efforts
to modify existing asylum law.'88 This argument holds that the line of
demarcation between gender-based persecution and acts of personal
violence will become diminished to the point that any act of personal
violence directed toward a female will qualify as a basis for granting
asylum. The parameters of what constitutes gender-based persecution defy
definition, slippery slope proponents contend, and this will result in any act
of personal domestic violence, including those not sanctioned by the state
or supported by governmental policy, to support a claim for asylum.
Clearly, however, definitional problems are present in any claim for
asylum. The definition as to what constitutes a persecutory act, the
definition as to what constitutes "political opinion," "social group," or
even "race" are no less problematic. The establishment of a category
specifically intended to address gender-related persecution will in no way
erode existing means for determining bases for asylum; rather, these will
be enhanced.
V. CONCLUSION

The attention now being focused upon the existence of gender-based
persecution is long overdue. An inestimable number of women have
survived flagrant state-sanctioned human rights violations specific to their
gender and sought asylum in the United States only to be forcibly returned
to the horrors from which they fled. It is uncertain what fate awaited these
women upon their repatriation. What is certain is that the adjudication of

183. See id.
184. Canada became the first country in the world to recognize that the persecution of women
based on gender may constitute grounds for granting refugee status. See Gomez, supra note 20, at
622.
185. See Bresnick, supra note 152, at 150.
186. See Bahl, supra note 1, at 70.
187. One commentator has argued that "[t]o accept women or gender as a social group would
not result in a dilution of the definition of refugee or the boundaries of the particular social group
category. Asylum is an individual, not a group, remedy." Id. at 71.
188. Id. at 70.
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their asylum claims was characterized by inconsistencies and
jurisprudential gymnastics. It is equally certain that such characteristics can
be relegated to history with the adoption of a specific category for genderbased claims for asylum. As our legal consciousness expands to include
unforeseen areas of human rights violations, so must our legal framework
expand to include new forms of redress.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss2/4

24

